Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

2018

Blockchain versus Data Protection
Fred H. Cate
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, fcate@indiana.edu

Christopher Kuner
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels

Orla Lynskey
London School of Economics

Christopher Millard
Queen Mary University of London

Nora Ni Loideain
University of London

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, E-Commerce Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Cate, Fred H.; Kuner, Christopher; Lynskey, Orla; Millard, Christopher; Ni Loideain, Nora; and Svantesson,
Dan Jerker B., "Blockchain versus Data Protection" (2018). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2691.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2691

This Editorial is brought to you for free and open access
by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Authors
Fred H. Cate, Christopher Kuner, Orla Lynskey, Christopher Millard, Nora Ni Loideain, and Dan Jerker B.
Svantesson

This editorial is available at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2691

International Data Privacy Law, 2018, Vol. 8, No. 2

EDITORIAL

103

Editorial

Blockchain versus data protection
Christopher Kuner*, Fred Cate**, Orla Lynskey**,
Christopher Millard**, Nora Ni Loideain** and
Dan Svantesson**
It is not uncommon for technological developments to
give rise to debates as to whether existing legal norms
and regulatory frameworks will be disrupted or undermined. A recent, high-profile, example is blockchain.
Most of the popular excitement about blockchain, so
far at least, relates to crypto-currencies, especially
Bitcoin, and related financial products such as Initial
Coin Offerings (ICOs). Less visibly, but probably more
importantly in the long run, a great deal of investment
is going into the development of a broad range of blockchain applications in contexts ranging from registration
of assets (including land) to self-executing (‘smart’)
contracts. Notwithstanding widespread confusion about
what exactly blockchain is or might become, blockchain
and distributed ledger technologies (DLTs) have caught
the imagination of governments, businesses, and private
investors, and they are increasingly a focus of attention
for legislators and regulators worldwide.
Of specific relevance to this Journal is the question of
how data protection concepts and rules will apply to
blockchain and, indeed, whether it might prove to be
impossible to build and deploy compliant blockchain
applications to the extent that that they involve the
processing of personal data. Indeed, Jan Philip Albrecht,
a Member of the European Parliament who played a
prominent role in the development and finalization of
the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), has asserted just that. In his view:
Certain technologies will not be compatible with the GDPR
if they don’t provide for [the exercising of data subjects’
rights] based on their architectural design. This does not
mean that blockchain technology, in general, has to adapt
to the GDPR, it just means that it probably can’t be used
for the processing of personal data.1

We consider Albrecht’s views on blockchain as a technology for processing personal data to be overly
*
**
1

Editor-in-Chief.
Editor.
D Mayer, ‘Blockchain Technology is on a Collision Course with EU
Privacy Law’ IAPP Privacy Advisor <https://iapp.org/news/a/blockchain-

negative. Whether personal data may be processed legitimately using blockchain technology will depend on the
specific technical and organizational model that underpins a particular blockchain application. Before we can
go any further, however, we need to clarify what we
mean by the term blockchain.
Unlike some other recently deployed technologies,
such as cloud computing, as yet there is no widely accepted definition of blockchain. This is perhaps because
blockchain technology is evolving rapidly and the term
is used to cover a broad range of models for establishing
and managing a ledger of transactions. Moreover, the
term blockchain is often used interchangeably with
other concepts such as DLT (see below regarding this
concept). Above all, the lack of technical precision that
often characterizes discussions of cryptocurrencies such
as Bitcoin has resulted in widespread confusion as to
what should, and should not, be regarded as an implementation of blockchain technology.
It may be helpful to pare the concept down into three
fundamental components. For our purposes, a blockchain is (i) a system for recording a series of data items
(such as transactions between parties) that (ii) uses
cryptography to make it difficult to tamper with past
ledger entries, and that (iii) has an agreed process for
storing one or more copies of the ledger and adding
new entries. This process is usually called ‘consensus’,
though that term may also be misleading. DLT refers to
a particular type of blockchain system that is ‘distributed’ across several, potentially many, ‘nodes’ (ie individuals or organizations that hold a copy of the
distributed ledger). ‘Consensus’ may be achieved in several different ways. These include the cumbersome and
energy-intensive ‘proof of work’ model used by Bitcoin,
whereby ‘miners’ compete to solve increasingly difficult
computational puzzles as a basis for adding a new block
technology-is-on-a-collision-course-with-eu-privacy-law/ > accessed 27
February 2018.
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to a chain, with the winner being rewarded in Bitcoin
for doing so. Other key characteristics of Bitcoin are
that it is open and ‘permissionless’, which means that
anyone may, without authorization, use Bitcoin and, indeed, may participate in the network as a node.
Widespread distribution of copies of the ledger, together with a consensus process that does not require
any centralized, trusted, intermediary to manage the
ledger, make Bitcoin and similar DLTs attractive as platforms for use by large numbers of parties who do not
trust, indeed may not even be able to identify, each
other.
It is, however, the very openness, lack of permissioning, and potential anonymity that make public blockchain systems like Bitcoin problematic from a legal and
regulatory perspective. For example, how can a financial
services regulator check that anti-money laundering
(AML) and know your customer (KYC) rules are being
complied with if a large number of parties can transfer
tokens between each other without involving any regulated entity or other intermediary that can be audited?
In terms of data protection compliance, is each node
that holds a copy of the distributed ledger a controller
in respect of all personal data in the ledger? Might each
node also, or instead, be a processor for the operator of
every other node? What is the status of the users of an
open cryptocurrency? Are they also all controllers and,
if so, in what circumstances might they be excused from
data protection compliance obligations because of an
exemption such as that for processing in the course of a
purely personal or household activity? How can controllers give instructions to processors regarding the processing of personal data when the parties may not even
know who they are dealing with? Indeed, if thousands
of nodes hold copies of data relating to transactions between millions of users how could they all contract with
each other anyway? Given that a node or user may be
anywhere on the planet, must it be assumed that any
personal data in a distributed ledger might be transferred worldwide? Is the proliferation of copies of data
in a DLT compatible with the data minimization principle? What happens if a data subject wishes to exercise
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an individual right, eg to correction or erasure of data if
the relevant data are stored in an ‘immutable’
blockchain?
Very few commentators have gone beyond identifying a selection of these questions and then concluding
that data protection compliance in relation to blockchain is highly problematic, or simply impossible. Does
this mean that Albrecht is right and that blockchain
probably cannot be used for the processing of personal
data?
Not necessarily. Let us step away from the Bitcoin
model and return to the core elements of blockchain as
being a tamper-evident ledger that is established and
maintained according to some kind of consensus protocol. Based on these fundamental elements, might it be
possible to develop and deploy a blockchain system that
is compatible with data protection by design principles?
Perhaps. For example, instead of being public and permissionless, the blockchain might be set up by a consortium that is governed by rules that establish the basis on
which each party will process any personal data that is
included in the blockchain. Moreover, instead of a distributed consensus mechanism such as proof of work,
the parties might agree to use some kind of ‘consensus
by authority’ whereby one or more participants has the
authority to add blocks to the chain, eg by each taking
turns to do so. Indeed, that role might be outsourced to
a trusted third party, perhaps even a cloud services provider that offers Blockchain as a Service (BaaS). It may
even be possible to design a blockchain that is ‘redactable’ or ‘editable’ without undermining the core characteristic of being a tamper-evident ledger. These are not
just hypothetical suggestions; blockchain arrangements
are currently being established that have some or all of
these features.
So, as with many issues that arise in data protection
law, the appropriate answer to the question of whether
a blockchain may be used to process personal data is
not binary but rather ‘It depends.’2
doi:10.1093/idpl/ipy009
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